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Carl A. LeVan. Dictators and Democracy in African Development: The Political Economy of Good Governance in Nigeria. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018. xix + 282 pp. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. $76.00. Cloth. ISBN: 978-1-107-08114-7.

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In Dictators and Democracy in African Development: The Political Economy of Good Governance in Nigeria, Carl A. LeVan seeks to provide an answer to the question: “How does the distribution… Click to show full abstract

In Dictators and Democracy in African Development: The Political Economy of Good Governance in Nigeria, Carl A. LeVan seeks to provide an answer to the question: “How does the distribution of political authority affect the Nigerian government’s ability to formulate and deliver policies conducive to development?” (3). Rather than refer to the standard set of factors typically used to explicate Nigeria’s underperformance, such as the colonial legacy, ethnic diversity, foreign debt, poor leadership, and the negative effects of a strong oil economy, LeVan refutes these orthodox explanations. He argues, instead, that “the key factor is not simply the status of the regime as a dictatorship or a democracy, but rather the structure of the policy-making process by which different policy demands are included or excluded” (4). Specifically, LeVan proposes that Nigeria’s governance performance has been weakened by the dominance of “veto players”—a concept he takes from George Tsebelis—who can obstruct policy reform and negotiate concessions. In proposing the “veto players” theory as an alternative narrative, LeVan draws from a variety of sources—including government documents, interviews, and newspapers—which he collected in Nigeria between 2003 and 2007. Using primarily a mixed-methods approach that encompasses an analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data of Nigeria’s postindependence history, and drawing from the author’s knowledge of Nigerian history, he determines the number of “veto players” in each year since independence in 1960 until 2007 and arrives at the conclusion that “conditions conducive for delivery of national collective goods are different from the conditions necessary to limit excess spending on local collective goods” (212). In other words, while a rise in the number of “veto players” reduces political corruption, this very same rise can impair decision-making at the national level and undermine policymakers’ ability to procure national public goods. One of the book’s primary strengths is its skillful explication of the notion of “veto players” and its application of this concept to Nigerian history in particular. In an effort to liberate “the ‘veto’ from its association with

Keywords: levan; veto; veto players; governance; economy; development

Journal Title: African Studies Review
Year Published: 2018

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