LAUSR

This book is a gem. Since Stokes’s 2005 seminal article, a significant number of contributions have vastly improved our knowledge about how and when clientelism works. As a result, it is hard to find new arguments about the topic. Muñoz’s book shows that there is still room for writing an original theory that enables us to understand why and how clientelism works in contexts of weak parties. Whereas most studies in the region focus on cases with well-established party machines, such as the Peronist party in Argentina, the PRI in Mexico, and the PT in Brazil, Muñoz’s book studies clientelism in Peru. Using a deviant case, Muñoz explains why clientelism persists “even though parties had remained inchoate since their collapse twenty years ago” and “political brokers lack longterm party affiliations” (4). Studying clientelism in Peru, Muñoz seeks to extend existing findings and provide a more full-fledged theory of clientelism without organized parties. Buying Audiences seeks to solve an interesting puzzle: why do we observe clientelistic mobilization in the absence of party machines? Existing explanations of electoral clientelism assume the presence of party machines. Clientelistic parties employ armies of brokers who know to whom to distribute resources (core or swing voters), who can mobilize them to attend rallies and elections, and who can monitor voters’ responses. Early studies of clientelism assume that to be effective, clientelistic strategies require brokers to mobilize and monitor poor voters’ participation. Recent works have begun questioning the need for both brokers and monitoring. Studying clientelism in Kenya, Kramon (2016) shows a case in which clientelism works without brokers or machines, and others have begun focusing on persuasion—questioning the idea that brokers only monitor voters (see, e.g., Finan and Schechter 2012; Lawson and Greene 2014). Muñoz’s book builds on these findings to provide an “informational theory” that explains the persistence of clientelism in unorganized settings. The book proposes “an informational theory of electoral clientelism” that focuses on the “information that strategic actors use to form their preferences and make electoral decisions. By informing various types of observers about candidates’ relative electoral viability and desirability, electoral clientelism indirectly affects electoral preferences and the outcome of elections” (33). “Electoral clientelism, thus, affects vote choices through two mechanisms. First, clientelism during campaigns is crucial to establish candidates’ electoral viability. . . . Second, candidates can use electoral clientelism to persuade voters while campaigning” (6). Muñoz’s theory provokes us to think about the indirect effects of electoral clientelism. One of the argument’s most compelling logical notions is to reframe our way of thinking about clientelism: instead of thinking that candidates use clientelism because they have a machine, Muñoz claims just the opposite: candidates use clientelism because they do not have one. Studying electoral clientelism in contexts where political machines BOOK REVIEWS 159