did not rush to join the “warrior community.” This was not just due to war fatigue and a growing distrust of state-provided information, but also a general dislike of Goebbels… Click to show full abstract
did not rush to join the “warrior community.” This was not just due to war fatigue and a growing distrust of state-provided information, but also a general dislike of Goebbels himself and the moral and material corruption of the Nazi leadership that he represented. This is an unexpected revelation in the book, that Germans, during the final months of the war, became increasingly concerned with government corruption and the inequalities within society more generally. Lohse suggests that many citizens were reacting to the failure of the Nazis’ promised social revolution. The topic of the Holocaust, specifically the dissemination and reception of information related to mass atrocities in the East is tackled in chapter 3. Journals, letters, SD reports, and POW recordings reveal that antisemitism was prevalent among civilians and soldiers and that many Germans “knew something” (74) about the killings. Rumors of mass executions were common, but stories of death camps and gas chambers were exceedingly rare. Nearly all rumored atrocities were attributed to the SS and its much-disliked leader, Heinrich Himmler. Chapter 4 investigates the popular response to the July 20, 1944 plot against Hitler and the early stages of the Allied invasion of Germany. Again, reactions were mixed. Some citizens expressed their sustained loyalty to the regime, while others grew more resentful of the leadership. No meaningful insight is gained here, simply that German morale continued to decrease alongside internal regime radicalization and home-front mobilization. The final chapter continues to resist a singular view of the German experience of defeat. The tragic battles of 1945 were met largely with desperation, but an enduring faith in Hitler and his messianic qualities inspired many citizens to continue fighting. Total defeat did not slow down the rumor mill, as gossip spread about the Führer’s declining health and refugees from the East delivered stories of violent acts carried out by the advancing Red Army. In the book’s conclusion, Lohse reminds us that there is no single story of Germans at war, and that it was not her intention to “forge one out of the chorus of voices” (150). While she does not attempt to assess the human condition or make any broad sociological claims, Lohse’s study is ultimately about how individuals, and their communities, make sense of wartime tragedy and hopelessness. German citizens were heavily influenced by the Hitler regime and its propaganda, but ultimately they constructed their own reality, in large part by collecting informal information from family members, friends, colleagues, and comrades. They talked a lot about the war and actively built and negotiated narratives of their own experiences of it. Prevail until the Bitter End offers a myriad of rich firsthand accounts, many of them never “heard” before, and is accompanied by meaningful analysis. Furthermore, Lohse’s work contributes to the still emerging and highly promising field of rumor culture.
               
Click one of the above tabs to view related content.