LAUSR

even possible for al-Juwayni to think in these terms. The third part of the book focuses on al-Juwayni’s legal theory. In Chapters 5 and 6, Siddiqui demonstrates that al-Juwayni rejected previous scholarly attempts to provide scriptural proofs for the legal sources of hadith and consensus (ijmāʿ) and instead justified them on rational grounds through recourse to custom. In the case of concurrent (mutawātir) reports, she writes, custom took the form of communal practices that attested to their once-widespread knowledge, and in the case of consensus, it took the form of juristic acceptance that indicated the existence of an early text that established its validity but was lost over time. Chapters 7 and 8 explore al-Juwayni’s defense of analogical reasoning (qiyās) despite his acknowledgment that the norms and rulings derived through it were probable at best. Siddiqui sees this as the moment he “allowed his desire for continuity to trump his desire for certainty” but shows how he nevertheless attempted to limit legal pluralism by establishing a hierarchy of qiyās forms and limiting the use of qiyās to the most advanced scholars, the mufti-mujtahids (p. 185). Siddiqui’s discerning analysis sheds light on al-Juwayni’s unique contribution to topics in legal theory that have been more broadly studied, such as the common good (mas lah a). The fourth part of the book examines al-Juwayni’s political thought and concludes that in political matters, he also sacrificed certainty for continuity. Chapter 9 summarizes al-Juwayni’s exposition of the ideal imamate and his acceptance of a competent (kāfī) ruler. Chapter 10 takes up his discussion of the survival of the shariʿa in the absence of rulers and scholars through a legal minimalism that depended on individual memory of legal knowledge and collective adherence to shariʿa-based custom. Siddiqui writes that this discussion allows us to see the shariʿa as a system of governance that is socially rooted and polyvalent, as opposed to a system of government that is institutionalized and externally imposed. Even in the absence of governments, institutions, rulers, and jurists, she contends, al-Juwayni’s work suggests that the shariʿa remains vital so long as it provides meaning for its followers and they remain committed to its narrative. Siddiqui concludes that al-Juwayni’s work has much to offer contemporary debates about Islamic legal reform and the relationship of the shariʿa to various political configurations, among other things. Siddiqui’s effort to connect al-Juwayni’s epistemology, legal theory, and political thought is truly valuable, as is her attempt to draw al-Juwayni’s work into contemporary debates. It also suggests avenues for future thought. First, what is the constitutional import of al-Juwayni’s view that the shariʿa occupies a place of categorical priority and what can this view offer the problematic of sovereignty as a transcendent authority that can exceed or overturn the law? Second, can a shariʿa reduced to a minimal legal corpus be meaningful? After all, as al-Juwayni acknowledged, the shariʿa survived for centuries without an ideal imam, but not without rulers who oversaw matters of war, internal order, the treasury, and the delegation of jurisdictions ( judgeships, governorships, and so on). Similarly, can a shariʿa denuded of the intellectual and social organization of the madhāhib, or the communal authority of a private class of scholars, survive? It is the achievement of Law and Politics under the Abbasids that it encourages readers to confront such questions and to consider al-Juwayni’s answers to them across a broad swath of his writings.