Photo by abeosorio from unsplash
Abstract The normative principle of description invariance presupposes that rational preferences must be complete. The completeness axiom is normatively dubious, however, and its rejection opens the door to rational framing… Click to show full abstract
Abstract The normative principle of description invariance presupposes that rational preferences must be complete. The completeness axiom is normatively dubious, however, and its rejection opens the door to rational framing effects. In this commentary, we suggest that Bermúdez's insightful challenge to the standard normative view of framing can be clarified and extended by situating it within a broader critique of completeness.
Keywords:
preferences rational;
rational framing;
framing effects;
incomplete preferences
Journal Title: Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Year Published: 2022
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!
Journal Title: Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Year Published: 2022
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!