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authority is exercised dominantly through recognisably modern state apparatuses, overseen by civilian political leaders chosen through a democratic process, staffed by a distinct cadre of professional public servants, and buffered by a monolithic system of state law” (Moore, “Globalisation and Power in Weak States,” Third World Quarterly 32 [November 2011]: 1757–76). Businessmen in Arms expands on this point by implying that when one looks at “elites,” one must broaden conceptions to include militaries in considering the MENA region. Indeed, many of the authors point to the economic and political advantages that military actors pursued as their respective countries shifted from import substitution industrialization (ISI) to neoliberally infused global engagement underscored by globalization. Given this volume’s extensive findings, external agencies looking to advance state strength in the MENA region would be well advised to consider the presence of the military in the larger affairs of national economic and political governance. As for gaps in the volume, while Iraq is mentioned in several chapters, the country does not have its own chapter-length consideration. This country case would have been helpful for a few reasons. One is that Iraq could have been treated to a similar historical analysis, as were the other country cases. Second, the penetration of outside forces in the form of the U.S.-led intervention in 2003 would spark intriguing questions, such as the following: Did the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime completely remove the economic and political prominence of Iraqi military actors? In concert with the aforementioned policymaking issues, did the United States take into account this long-standing prominence in their statebuilding considerations? In what ways have the reformed Iraqi military actors returned to old practices, or have new dynamics developed? Third, given that the editors wished the volume to examine nonstate armed groups (NSAGs) where they have emerged (p. 15), an Iraq country case would have allowed for an exploration of many groups with regional, ethnic, religious, and terroristic credentials. Surprisingly, in the volume, NSAGs are especially present in the Syrian, Libyan, and Yemeni cases, though surprisingly not in the Pakistani one. The matter of outside penetration might have been scrutinized in a more fulsome way too. By relying on outside actors for their aid and for their technological savvy, in what ways does this promote the proposition “that patronage is steadily supplanting professionalism” within the militaries of case countries (p. xiii)? How do these relationships permit militaries not to concentrate on national security tasks? Certainly, the volume does not ignore this matter entirely; it receives a particular mention in the forward (p. xii). As well, there are some hints in some country examinations (e.g., Jordan’s King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau). No doubt these relationships make real the economic and political power of military actors in the MENA region. Nevertheless, the different authors’ handling of this matter is inconsistent, despite the historical Cold War relationships and the more recent funding for counterterrorism efforts. This is also true despite the long-standing global dependency in arms manufacture and distribution between the developed and developing worlds (e.g., Keith Krause, Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade, 1992). In sum, though Businessmen in Arms lacks complete considerations of Iraq and embedded global power dynamics and relationships, its individual country case analyses are quite rich and offer important insights for interested academics and policymakers alike. For these reasons, it is a valuable addition to the scholarly literature on this topic.