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mainstream proximate co-opts the platform of the extreme right, effectively “crowding out” any potential right-wing contender. In Hungary and Poland, for example, the mainstream conservative parties co-opted the positions of the far right, weakening the existing far-right party and preventing right-wing party entrants, respectively. In Hungary, the post-2010 ruling Fidesz Party adopted the ideological position of the Jobbik Party to such an extent that Jobbik engaged in ethnic underbidding in the 2018 and 2020 elections in order to remain electorally relevant —even cooperating with its liberal nemeses to try to push the ruling Fidesz Party out of its commanding positions in local and national elections. In doing so, the radical right party and its proximate mainstream “traded places” on many issues, including opposition to accepting refugees and the question of whether the George Soros-backed Central European University should be forced out of Hungary. Although Jobbik still adheres to many of its right-wing ideological positions, a focus on the fortunes of this party misses much of the picture of radical right-wing politics in Hungary. That said, the core of Bustikova’s account finds empirical support in Hungary. Survey research by Karácsony and Róna (“The Secret of Jobbik: Reasons behind the Rise of the Hungarian Radical Right,” Journal of East European and Asian Studies 2(1), 2011) showed that the intensity of anti-Roma attitudes is indeed the principal factor separating Jobbik supporters from their more mainstream Fidesz counterparts. Moreover, Jobbik supporters are strongly opposed to government support for the Roma minority, also consistent with Bustikova’s predictions. However, another reason for Jobbik’s breakthrough in the 2009 European Parliamentary Election was certainly the significant uptick in intercommunal strife between the ethnic communities in the year leading up to the election and the accompanying increased focus in the media on “gypsy crime,” which redounded to the benefit of a party that promised to solve the “Roma problem.” Jobbik’s anticapitalist, antiestablishment message also strengthened its appeal to voters opposed to western integration or dissatisfied with the benefits provided by the postcommunist system (András Kovács, “Antisemitic Prejudice and Political Antisemitism in Present-Day Hungary,” Journal for the Study of Antisemitism 4, 2012). This suggests that a broader complex of factors comprised the reactionary dynamic that led to Jobbik’s historic breakthrough. In light of this, the question may be asked whether the real action is not between parties but in wider reactionary movements in society. Such movements are sometimes manifested in the radicalization of mainstream conservative parties, sometimes in increased support for marginal extremist parties, and sometimes in both. It may be true, as Bustikova observes, that it is rare for radical right parties to move from the margins to the mainstream, but both the German National Socialists and the Italian Fascists came out of the margins to become their countries’ ruling parties —the first at the ballot box and the second through royal appointment. In other words, two of the most important right-wing dictatorships in history had their origins in broader reactionary movements that catapulted oncemarginal parties into positions of total power. It cannot be ruled out that one or more of today’s contemporary farright parties could completely eclipse their mainstream conservative counterparts—as the National Socialists did to the German National People’s Party in the 1930 federal election. In none of these cases was the boundary between mainstream and extreme right-wing parties clean. If, in contrast, we accept that understanding the success of far-right parties is important in its own right (whether or not they remain marginal), then it is worth asking what other things make these particular parties distinct from their mainstream counterparts. To answer this question, the ideological characteristics of these parties deserve further investigation. Notably, anti-Semitism, authoritarianism, and antiestablishmentarianism are also hallmarks of Jobbik (Zsolt Enyedi, “Paternalist Populism and Illiberal Elitism in Central Europe,” Journal of Political Ideologies 21(1), 2016), as they are of other far-right parties in the region and elsewhere. And whereas anti-Roma sentiment in Hungary has remained relatively constant over time, anti-Semitism increased substantially after 2006, sentiments that correlated strongly with support for Jobbik. Yet, it is not clear why this is the case or what role, if any, these additional hallmark features play in the story being told here. None of these questions detract in any way from the quality of Bustikova’s book, a shining example of problemoriented research that convinces the reader, step by careful step, of a general theory of right-wing party success and failure in the region of Eastern Europe. It also offers future researchers a promising template to guide further investigation of the right-wing political dynamic in the region and beyond. Extreme Reactions is sure to become essential reading for any student of the radical right, as well as anyone seeking to understand the fortunes of right-wing parties in Eastern Europe and in PR systems around the world.