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to “address climate security risks humanely and systematically at the national, regional and international levels” (p. 51). The argument is rooted in the claim that “[c]limate change can now be modelled with a relatively high degree of certainty, especially when compared to other drivers of international security like economic crises or territorial disputes” (pp. 52–53). For example, “climate models can help project the implications of ... lowprobability events, which means there is the capacity to prepare for and prevent them” (p. 53). A compelling case can be made for the responsibility of the Global North, which continues to emit, pollute, and consume at many times the rate of the Global South. But there are challenges in tying this responsibility to our ability to model climate change. In a complex world (many variables, multiple feedback loops, emergent properties, and so on), predicting probabilities and impacts is very difficult. Imagine a very high-impact compound flood event that would overwhelm existing flood defense systems, displace large numbers of people, and cause extensive direct and indirect damage. Based on excellent fluvial, pluvial, and ocean surge data going back decades, we might feel confident that under a given climate future the return period currently used for insurance or project approval purposes should contract dramatically (maybe from 200 years to 50 years). Holding development constant, we will still have multiple possible climate futures to consider; if we also model different development futures we will have a large range of possibility for both the flood event and its impacts. Because there will be many places vulnerable to highly destructive compound flood events (or droughts or fires and so on), we can predict that the world will experience many more of these in the future than in the past—but this information is likely to be too coarse to inform investments that need to be precise to be effective. Increasing mitigation efforts and deepening resilience make sense, but we have to be cautious about assigning more predictive capacity to current models than is warranted, appreciative of extensive data gaps throughout the Global South that constrain models, and alert to the blind spots current models embody. This section concludes with a very innovative chapter in which Dan Smith uses Kate Raworth’s doughnut model (Doughnut Economics, 2017). Smith asks us to reimagine security in a way that brings human and national security together and links them to the Sustainable Development Goals. Part II leverages the concept of the Anthropocene to rethink security. Simon Dalby provides a brilliant argument that climate change is an economic problem and the solution is clear—decarbonize the global economy. As clean hydrogen energy appears increasingly within reach, the opportunity to mobilize aroundDalby’s analysis seems greater than ever. Anthony Burke and Stefanie Fishel offer a clear step beyond the very anthropocentric aspirations of Stockholm: “push on with legal, institutional and ethical innovations that can secure all the beings and worlds that share the earth” (pp. 115–16). Beatriz Rodrigues Bessa Mattos and Sebastián Granda Henao argue eloquently for expanding our purview beyond the “material evidence of climate change” to explore how it “puts modes of living on earth in jeopardy” (p. 130). These three arguments neatly set up the afterword, in which the authors lay out a postStockholm era agenda focused on overcoming the limits of global institutions, foregrounding those who are at greatest risk, decarbonizing the global economy, expanding perspectives on environmental security, and embracing a “holistic, lived and plural sense of security” (p. 136). In June 2022, the governments of Sweden and Kenya, cohosts of Stockholmþ50, published 10 recommendations summarizing the conclusions of that conference. Although the Stockholmþ50 language tends to be generic and vague, it seems there is much overlap and agreement between the two visions. Both stress the need to transform the global economy, strengthen institutions, and take responsibility for the earth of future generations. But Stockholmþ50 endorses an explicitly human-centered view, does not challenge the primacy of state and international institutions, avoids the issue of unequal vulnerabilities, and does not mention the moral standing of the nonhuman world. I strongly recommend those concerned with the future of our shared planet read this excellent volume, review the outputs of Stockholmþ50, and join the critical debate at the intersection of these two worldviews.