LAUSR

only against an unavoidable propositional content about the world—that is, beliefs about the way the world is or the way it ought to be. Even when the agent herself is not conscious of that belief, the action is subject to rational reconstruction. Some readers will find this a thin ledge from which to launch either a concrete political argument or an argument about politics in a pluralistic society. Vaccines work and anthropogenic climate change is real, but the Socratic elenchus Steinberger occasionally seems to propose (p. 161) as our tool feels inadequate against staunch and so often irrational refusals by those who deny both. Still, I find it hopeful to think there is a need for rational justification in our debates even with all the burdens of judgment our messy psychologies put in our way. It takes some effort to appreciate the book. At times, Rationalism in Politics is not very reader-friendly. Steinberger explicitly says the book is meant for political theorists (p. ix), but I wonder how many are as familiar with the analytic philosophy debates as he seems to assume. Sometimes, he very helpfully lays out an idea or a particular philosopher’s position, but equally often he writes in a conceptual shorthand that may leave a reader reaching for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. For example, “Gricean flouting” (p. 70), “Gettier problems” (p. 98), and even “Kant’s third antinomy” (p. 154) probably ought to be explained and not just mentioned. This air of writing for those already in the know is exacerbated by the almost total absence of first names in Steinberger’s prose. By itself, this is minor (and may well be an editorial decision by the publisher), but the effect for some readersmay be alienating. It will also be confusing for those readers who mistakenly think the analytic philosopher Strawson whom Steinberger discusses is the contemporary Galen Strawson, a frequent contributor to the Times Literary Supplement, and not Galen’s late father, P. F. Strawson. Despite these challenges, the payoff of Steinberger’s book is an appreciation of a kind of rationalism that is subtler than critics from Oakeshott onward have claimed. It would be facile to claim that any causal links connect the nonrationalist trends in political theory to the contemporary politics of “post-truth,” but it is heartening to encounter a thoughtfully argued and plausible case against the very concept of post-truth politics.