LAUSR

Abstract This paper highlights the impact of religious oppositions in Muslim-majority states towards security cooperation with the U.S. Such cooperation provides security but is risky as the U.S. can coerce its weaker allies and push for regime change. To protect against this possibility, this paper suggests that incumbents in recipient states strategically extend or limit cooperation based on the strength of Islamist opposition parties. Weaker Islamist oppositions pose a threat to incumbents in recipient states as the U.S. can coerce and replace them without fear of bringing anti-U.S. elements to power, which results in lower cooperation. In case of a stronger Islamist opposition, the regime's replacement cannot offer better policy concessions to the U.S.; hence, a strong Islamist opposition leads to more extensive cooperation. This mechanism is demonstrated through U.S. military aid acceptance in 40 Muslim-majority states during 2002–2015, and a comparison of U.S. security relations with Algeria and Tunisia.