LAUSR

objectives set out by Iosif Stalin. Sokolovsky was a protégé of Marshal Georgii Zhukov who rose to become Minister of Defense at the peak of his career, so it was to his advantage to omit discussion of the campaign. At the same time, Rokossovsky’s front performed the best of the three fronts involved—though his front also failed to achieve its ultimate goals—but to praise him would inevitably draw attention to the failure of the other two fronts. The evidence the Glantzes provide indicates that it is more accurate to see it as a campaign that was never included in the history of the war. They do heap well-deserved praise on Rokossovsky for his part in the campaign that only adds to his already well-established reputation for being an effective field commander of large forces. The underlying argument of this campaign history is that the campaign failed to liberate Belorussia by the spring of 1944 even though the attacking Soviet forces, fighting in terrible rainy and snowy weather, outnumbered the Germans 2–1 in personnel and 3–1 in armor and were supplied with a prodigious amount of artillery. By fatally weakening the Germans they did create the conditions for success for the subsequent campaign, “Operation Bagration,” launched in favorable summer weather with forces that outnumbered the Germans 2.5–1 in personnel and 5–1 in armor, which succeeded in destroying the Germans’ Army Group Center and fully liberating Belorussia and advancing into Poland. The Germans are given credit for their tenacious and talented defense. At the end of the campaign Sokolovsky was taken to task after the battle for his ineptness and mishandling of his front by Stalin. The authors do not come down firmly on one side of the other as to whether they think his demotion was deserved or not. They present the findings of the official investigation, which showed the many failures of his leadership, however they do not mention in his defense that Sokolovsky was rushed by the high command to implement plans that they forced on him at the expense of his own plans. They also do not mention that the success of Operation Bagration was facilitated by the Allied landings in Normandy, which prevented the Germans from reinforcing their retreating armies in Russia. The book is divided into two parts, with a total of twenty-three chapters that divide the campaign between the efforts made October through December 1943 and those made between December 1943 and April 1944. Within each part, the narrative proceeds chronologically by the attacks waged by each of the three fronts. The narrative is supported by 172 maps, a few of which are of dubious value for lack of visual clarity—they appear to be poor quality photographs of Soviet Army originals—and fifty-two tables: some of chronology, others of the order of battle. This book is a mustread for those interested in the operational details of Eastern Front battles and understand military history jargon.