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could easily gain international importance, and guerilla-style adventurers, such as Baron Roman Ungern and Ataman Grigory Semenov, could build quasi-states. These adventurers had their own resources: Babujab exploited the Mongolians’ aspiration for Inner Mongolia (Nakami Tatsuo’s chapter); Semenov and Khorvat’s influence depended on their control of the Chinese Eastern Railway (David Wolff’s chapter); and Baltic German Ungern brought a multicultural paramilitary tradition from European battlefields to the east (Willard Sunderland calls it “violent migration”). Japan’s support slightly supplemented these resources. As Nakami argues, it was in this period of easy expansion that the Japanese right began to regard Manchuria and Inner Mongolia as Japan’s Lebensraum. In the 1930s, when European powers resumed their commitment to Far East matters, Japan faced the question of how to maintain its overextended sphere of interest. Total mobilization during World War I facilitated mass democracy, to which Tomita Takeshi attributes emerging new strategies in Japan’s military circles. Tomita compares the generations of Tanaka Giichi (b. 1864, prime minister in 1927–1929) and Araki Sadao (b. 1877, war minister in 1931–1934). Tanaka was not only a general, but also a patronal politician of the Seiyukai (Constitutional Association of Political Friendship), and was aware that wars after World War I could not be conducted without total mobilization of the national economy and feared that Japan’s intervention in Siberia would radicalize Russian peasants. Araki would become a leader of Kodo-ha (intra-army faction of Imperial Way) in the 1930s. Tomita explains the diversion of these figures by their differing commitments to World War I and the Intervention. For example, Araki earnestly supported Semenov because both of them had anti-aristocratic tendencies. Yokote Shinji investigates the Pan-Asianism proposed by Okawa Shumei (1886–1957), the only civilian (non-government officer) defendant in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. In the 1910s, Toyama Mitsuru, Okawa, and other Japanese right-wing advocates had close contacts with Asian nationalists, such as Sun Yatsen and Chandra Bose. Yokote traces Okawa’s ideological trajectory, which ended up advocating anti-imperialist cooperation with the Soviet Union. Japan could not become a consistent anti-imperial empire, however. The Japanese right supported nationalism in British India, but the Japanese Army conflicted with the Czech Legion, encouraging Korean and Chinese nationalist movements against Japan (Hayashi Tadayuki’s chapter). The collection is voluminous and may seem to lack central concepts that serve to unify chapters, which are excellent by themselves. Yet this is a reflection of the early stage of studies on the Eastern Front of World War I and the Intervention. This collection is an indispensable volume for specialists in modern Far East history.