LAUSR

Although theories of personality and human behavior have long assumed that the self is affectively complex, widely used indirect measures of implicit self-evaluations have largely focused on the robustness and cultural universality of the self's positivity. Such indirect measures assess evaluations on a single continuum, ranging from positive to negative. Thus, they focus on the self's relative positivity and are inherently incapable of assessing whether the self is associated with good and bad. Using the well-established evaluative priming task, the present work tested the hypothesis that positive implicit self-evaluations coexist with an inkling of negative implicit self-evaluations. Studies 1 and 2 empirically demonstrated that priming the self facilitated the classification of both positive and negative targets (bivalent-priming). In contrast, replicating classic findings, priming a personally significant, liked object facilitated the classification of positive targets and inhibited the classification of negative targets (univalent-priming). Study 3 showed that the bivalent-priming triggered by self-primes cannot be explained by alternative accounts (e.g., arousal, vigilance). Meta-analyses of all studies attests to the robustness and reproducibility of self-primes triggering both positive and negative implicit evaluations. Moreover, tests estimating heterogeneity in the strength of implicit self-evaluations indicated that individual differences in nonclinical, healthy individuals may be limited, possibly reflecting measurement limitations, the nature of implicit self-evaluations, or both. Overall, the present work shines a spotlight on a previously undocumented effect: Despite the self's robust net positivity, the self reliably triggers negative implicit self-evaluations. Implications for the conceptualization, assessment, and consequences of implicit self-evaluations are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).