LAUSR

ABSTRACT This article presents a new model of mortgage loans under reasonable assumptions. A several key variables that affects the success of a project, such as project risk, total investment, lending rate,mortgage, and self-financing are jointly considered in the model. The model takes the participation constraints and the incentive compatibility constraints into account for enterprises and banks on project investment actions respectively. Our model can explain the coexistence scenario of small medium enterprises’ (SMEs) financing difficulties and credit rationing in credit markets with asymmetric information. It reveals that higher enterprise self-financing for the project is a “credible factor” to the bank. Banks put forward strict requirements on mortgage for the SMEs with low proportion of project self-financing, which will lead to two scenarios:one is that some SMEs would not get loans due to insufficient mortgage assets; other is that some SMEs will voluntarily give up loans because of loan requirements, even if they have enough mortgage assets. Rationing is implemented both to large enterprises and SMEs, but the degree of rationing is gradually strengthened with the reduction of self-financing scale for the project.