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ABSTRACT We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or… Click to show full abstract
ABSTRACT We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as (make-believed) belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.
Keywords:
truth fiction;
truth;
belief revision;
impossible worlds
Journal Title: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Year Published: 2019
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Journal Title: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Year Published: 2019
Link to full text (if available)
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recommendations!