LAUSR

Several of the papers concern themselves with the relationship between ‘reality’, ‘model’ and ‘knowledge’. Although a central issue is whether it is possible to gain knowledge of ‘reality’ (empiricism vs. rationalism), the primary goal of these papers is to investigate the relationship between ‘reality’ (meaning an observed phenomenon) and a conceptual ‘model’ that selectively incorporates portions of the observed phenomenon. A specific example is helpful, and is explored in detail in Chuang Liu’s paper ‘Models, Fiction, and Fictional Models’. The example chosen is from basic electrostatics: a motionless point charge located a distance ‘z’ from an infinite conducting plane. Already this is a model that is, in a strict sense, unphysical. Not only is an infinite flat plane unphysical, but the motionless point charge is also unphysical. However, scientists would not call this a fictional model; perhaps an ‘idealised’ or ‘approximate’ model of a real system. To solve this problem however, the standard approach replaces the conducting plane with an oppositely charged motionless point particle located a depth ‘z’ from the planethis is the method of image charges. Most scientists would agree that this second model is a fictional model just as in optics, when ‘virtual images’ are located behind opaque solid surfaces (curved mirrors, for example). Far from being an academic exercise, the author then turns to models of unobservable systems atoms and molecules and rightly poses questions about how scientists are to know that the model is ‘fictional’ or not, how to establish the model generates knowledge and how to evaluate competing models. Several other papers discuss the notion of ‘how does the scientific method generate knowledge?’ Again, this line of thought goes back centuries, but Guichun Guo asks if it possible to provide a uniform (across the scientific disciplines) answer to that question (answer: possibly), and Janet Kourany turns the question around, asking in the contexts of tobacco industry funded research, climate-change denying studies and studies of racism ‘how can we discuss the fact that scientific methods are often applied to intentionally produce ignorance?’ Zhu Xu presents an interesting discussion about ‘causative explanations’ in science (for example, use of molecular mechanisms to ‘explain’ biological processes) and discusses a particular theory, ‘event-property theory’ that may provide a way to avoid circular reasoning. All together, I found this book to be an interesting read not a book to be read at the beach during summer, but a book that can be read slowly and digested over time.