LAUSR

ABSTRACT Précis of Michael E. Bratman, Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality. The planning theory highlights our capacity to settle on future courses of action in ways that Philosophy Department, shape on-going thought and action. Given our resource limits, our prior plans exhibit a characteristic partiality. Given this partiality, pressures for means-end coherence lead to problems of means. In solving these problems, one is constrained by pressures of consistency and intention stability, pressures that induce a filter of admissibility on solutions. Such plan-infused functioning involves guidance of practical thinking by norms of intention rationality, including norms of consistency, agglomerativity, means-end coherence, and stability over time. These essays focus on questions about the nature of and support for these norms. The essays aim to incorporate but go beyond a two-tier pragmatic rationale for these norms. They seek a view between a skeptical ‘myth theory’ and a cognitivist view that sees these norms as a matter of theoretical rationality. The essays argue that these norms track conditions of a planning agent’s self-governance, both at a time and over time; and the essays explain the reflective significance of this tracking in part by appeal to our entrenched, though contingent, end of our diachronic self-governance.