LAUSR

ABSTRACT North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is built on a mountain of deception and denial – calling into question whether Pyongyang can be trusted to follow through on any nuclear deal it might strike. On the other hand, Kim Jong-un may now have made a strategic decision to abandon nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in exchange for economic assistance, improved relations with the United States, and security assurances. If so, any agreement over nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles must be independently verified – a process that would require Pyongyang to allow unprecedented access to its facilities, people, documents, and weapons. Even if Pyongyang provides such access, verifying the elimination of North Korea’s existing nuclear arsenal would be extremely challenging; verifying the elimination of its ballistic missile program could be even more challenging. Any verification regime is likely to involve a degree of uncertainty. But a degree of uncertainty might be an acceptable price to pay for the elimination of the vast bulk of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.