LAUSR

Abstract This article explores the successful Syrian chemical weapons disarmament process (2013–2014) within the context of post-Cold War coercive arms control policy and scholarship, particularly related to the Middle East. Based on extensive interviews with individuals involved in the process, we explore the coexistence of two rival, apparently contradictory narratives: one (backed by Western states) claimed coercion was the main contributor to disarmament, while the other (defended by Syrian authorities and Russia) insisted on the process’s consensual features. Our study suggests that the hybrid disarmament framework, embodied in a unique joint mission between the United Nations and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, conveniently accommodated both narratives, which in turn contributed to the mission’s success. We then ask whether, with the apparent US retreat in the Middle East, the Syrian case (as well as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal) signals a possible turn in international non-conventional arms control processes that would leave more room for consent and diplomacy.