LAUSR

ABSTRACT In this study, I investigate the impact of post-conflict trials on peace stability in post-conflict countries. I contend that empirical effects of post-conflict trials are contingent upon the partiality of the proceedings. While impartial trials promote accountability and confidence in the rule of law, partisan trials marginalize opposition forces and provide selective amnesties for government allies. To create comparable insights on partiality levels of post-conflict trials, I conduct an expert survey evaluating all major post-conflict trials between 1946 and 2005 (53 trials in total). The findings reveal that most trials were partisan while few represented genuine instances of accountability-seeking. Building on these insights, a quantitative analysis disentangles the impacts of partisan and impartial trials on peace stability using a global sample of post-conflict episodes (N = 265). The results demonstrate that positive effects of post-conflict trials on peace stability are primarily driven by partisan trials. Hence, the correlation between post-conflict trials and peace stability is mainly a product of power consolidation operating through coercive victor’s justice. While impartial post-conflict trials likewise tend to stabilize peace, their incidence is too small to trace a generalizable effect in a quantitative analysis. In light of these findings, this study calls for restraint when making consequentialist arguments about choices of post-conflict justice instruments.