LAUSR

This issue of ROAPE appears at a time when, among Africanists and internationalists, three preoccupations struggle for prominence: first, (plans and preparation for and reactions to) elections in several African countries; second, unfolding ‘complex emergencies’ in east, west and southern Africa; and, finally, the new and unfolding ‘complex realities’ of the UK Brexit vote and the start of a Trump presidency. Recent developments in the Gambia provide an example of how these different issues, and associated debates, can intersect. Thus, while incumbents John Dramani Mahama (Ghana) and the Gambia’s Yahya Jammeh both initially conceded defeat in December 2016 presidential elections to their respective opponents, Jammeh would later retract his concession, plunging the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region into a political crisis lasting several weeks into the new year (Smith 2017). Jammeh’s eventual departure into exile in Equatorial Guinea on 21 January 2017, partly under threat of forcible removal by ECOWAS forces to make way for his elected successor, marked a seeming resolution to this potential ‘complex emergency’ (Maclean 2017). But the episode continues to stimulate reflection and debate – including much popular satirical commentary on social media. At the same time, there have been the inevitable and varied references to Trump and Brexit – most commonly whether and how a Trump administration might react to the Gambia crisis and its immediate aftermath (development funds were promised following the inauguration of President-Elect Adama Barrow), and whether its America First policy, in signalling a withdrawal from America’s traditional global leadership role, might serve to embolden future Jammehs. But, frequently, too, what a swift return to the Commonwealth might yield in the form of a potentially enhanced status with a post-Brexit United Kingdom, which President Barrow reportedly described on Sky Television as ‘our number one partner in terms of trade, in terms of democracy, in terms of good governance’ (Crawford 2017). And, finally, what Gambia’s notification to quit the International Criminal Court in October and declared commitment to human rights and belief in public accountability mean for relations with the EU. The latter strongly and publicly supported Barrow’s accession to the presidency; and has promptly released development funds previously withheld as a result of governance concerns under the Jammeh regime. The EU has also promised further significant support for the country’s emerging political and economic recovery programme (Ceesay 2017; Maclean and Jammeh 2017). These promises require in turn that the new regime ‘delivers on its promises’, while adhering to the principles and objectives set out in the Cotonou Agreement (Anders 2017; Darboe 2017a). Clearly, while it is too early for conclusions of any kind about Gambia’s recent experience to be drawn, there is understandable interest in identifying wider lessons from the specifics of the case (Anders 2017; Cheeseman 2017; Hultin 2017). Somewhat helpfully, President Barrow frames the immediate (and specific) challenges that his country faces in governance and in development-related terms, which resonate well beyond the country’s borders: