LAUSR

ABSTRACT According to the medical model that prevails in the Western world, mental disorder is a form of illness, parallel to bodily illness, which can be diagnosed by a doctor on the basis of symptoms and administered treatments designed to “cure” it. However, it seems clear that how we understand “disorder” is influenced by cultural norms and values. Theorists associated with the so-called anti-psychiatry movement have gone so far as to claim that ‘mental illness’ simply is the accepted term for behaviors and experiences that are problematic or do not fit the cultural norm. In my view, however, this social-constructionist view downplays and obscures the very real difficulties encountered by subjects with mental disorder. I argue that rather than rejecting the medical model altogether, we should revise the model by utilizing insights from the enactivist approach in philosophy of mind. An appeal to the enactivist notions of autonomy, sense-making, and adaptivity, I propose, can help us to (a) account for mental disorder’s normative aspect, so that we can navigate a middle way between the medical model and an anti-psychiatry stance; and (b) understand the way in which the neurobiological, social, and existential dimensions of mental disorder are integrated.