LAUSR

ABSTRACT Analogical reasoning is often employed in problem-solving and metaphor interpretation. This paper submits that, as a default, analogical reasoning addressing these different tasks employs different mapping strategies. In problem-solving, it employs analogy-maximising strategies (like structure mapping, Gentner, D., & Markman, A. B. (1997). Structure mapping in analogy and similarity. American Psychologist, 52, 45–56); in metaphor interpretation, analogy-minimising strategies (like ATT-Meta, Barnden, J. A. (2015). Open-ended elaborations in creative metaphor. In T. R. Besold, M. Schorlemmer, & A. Smaill (Eds.), Computational creativity research: Towards creative machines (pp. 217–242). Berlin: Springer). The two strategies interact in analogical reasoning with conceptual metaphors. This interaction leads to predictable fallacies. The paper supports these hypotheses through case-studies on “mind” metaphors from ordinary discourse, and abstract problem-solving in the philosophy of mind, respectively. It shows that (1) default metaphorical interpretations for vision- and space-cognition metaphors can be derived with a variant of the analogy-minimising ATT-Meta approach, (2) philosophically influential introspective conceptions of the mind can be derived with conceptual metaphors only through an analogy-maximising strategy, and (3) the interaction of these strategies leads to hitherto unrecognised fallacies in analogical reasoning with metaphors. This yields a debunking explanation of introspective conceptions.