LAUSR

ABSTRACT After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States called on Muslims to join it in its struggle against the attacks’ perpetrator, Al Qaeda (AQ). U.S. officials argued that Muslim states’ participation in these efforts could help the United States defeat AQ, but it could also benefit the states themselves by undermining the threat they faced from terrorism. As we are now over ten years out from the beginning of this global war on terrorism, it is possible to both ask and answer the question posed by U.S. demands: did it work? That is, did majority-Muslim states who implemented counterterrorism policies in line with America’s counterterrorism priorities benefit from this, through a reduction in the threat of terrorism? In this article, I argue that Muslim states that adopted policies in line with US priorities would accomplish their primary goal: disrupting Al Qaeda’s ability to carry out attacks. I use a quantitative analysis to demonstrate that states implementing the counterterrorism policies preferred by the United States experienced significantly fewer deaths from terrorist attacks than those that did not. These findings can contribute to debates over the global war on terrorism, as well as broad debates on effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency tactics.