LAUSR

Abstract Twenty-five years ago, as preferential trade agreements started to proliferate, Jagdish Bhagwati sounded the ‘spaghetti bowl’ alarm, arguing that the ensuing complexity would create inefficiencies in the international system and challenges for firms navigating overlapping rules. This article seeks to update and complement Bhagwati’s thesis by asking if proliferating ‘deep’ trade agreements add a new dimension of complexity to this picture. This article shows that the early answer to this question is ‘not yet’, as governments have discovered that prospective conflicts with existing or simultaneous commitments limit just how deep the provisions of an agreement can be. Governments managing multiple deep agreements play a variation on Putnam’s two-level game. As Putnam theorized, these governments reconcile domestic interests with international opportunities in formulating their strategies. However, ensuring compatibility across various, sometimes competing international opportunities is also a key consideration. Canada’s concurrent participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Canada–European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) provides a crucial exploratory case study.