LAUSR

ited yield when compared with his rigorous historical analysis allude to longstanding ontological, epistemological and methodological issues for IR scholarship on emotions moving forward. Though many non-rational choice scholars envy the parsimony of rational choice modelling, Markwica rightly points out that humans often ‘violate its core premises’ (260). But is he right that they do so sufficiently ‘systematically’ for these violations to be modelled via alternative logics? Are the emotions he describes and their interpretations not too context specific (both socially and historically) for their impacts to be understood systematically across time and space? For example, if, as Markwica writes, the ‘universal’ emotion ‘fear’ can lead to some combination of dispositions to fight, flight or freeze (the three most obvious possible responses to a threat) and this logic must be supplemented by additional knowledge of rational choice constraints and long-term considerations of identity and norms, what added value does this systematization truly provide compared with more theoretically sparse historical analysis? Though Markwica has offered an impressive example of one approach to the issues that the concept of emotions raises for IR, these debates are far from settled.