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claim that any of them are objects of discourse – that they belong to the ontology. But what is paradoxical is that Priest, who holds the principle that objects are what is thought of, or referred to, says that: ‘g, not being anything, it is not an object’ (27). Priest is thinking and saying that g is not anything; what does that make of g, if not something and an object? And yet Priest takes just this statement to be the proof that g ‘is not an object’; and holds that this licenses g’s contradictory status and the necessity to embrace dialethism to account for the unity of objects. But as I argued we have no reason to accept that the gluon’s dialetheic status has anything to do with the gluon being such as to be identical to each of many objects it unifies. On account of the above and further reasons that I have no space to develop here, Priest does not deliver in the book the promised account of the unity of objects; and the problem does not lie in embracing or rejecting his dialetheism: Priest has not shown how dialetheism would solve the issue of the unity of objects, even if one was willing to buy into the view. However, there is much else that the book does achieve and is praiseworthy for. The book is the expression of a philosophically ambitious project, that speaks to the philosophical community at large, giving much food for thought to metaphysicians, ethicists and historians of philosophy alike, from all traditions. Anyone who disagrees with its conclusions should feel motivated to throw his or her hat in the argumentative arena, and this can only be beneficial to our collective progress in thinking about the problem of the unity of objects.