LAUSR

Thinking deeply about how a nuclear war might break out is neither easy nor enjoyable. Scholars do so, however, because we hope that contemplating the pathways by which such a cataclysm might happen today could lower the risk one will happen in the future. For that reason, we owe a special thanks to Mark S. Bell, Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Yogesh Joshi, Benôıt Pelopidas, and Kjølv Egeland, who have joined us in this discomforting mission. Our article found that different states have similar “kettles of hawks” who favored nuclear use across different scenarios. We are pleased that the contributors to this exchange have formed “a parliament of owls” that has raised important questions, forwarded valuable insights, helped us clarify key points in our own thinking, and pointed the way toward critical new research on nuclear war. One important factor that could affect the likelihood of nuclear war is whether the public would be a constraint on or a goad to political leaders contemplating the use of nuclear weapons. Aided by new survey methods in the past decade, scholars, including those contributing to this symposium, have made significant progress in understanding how the publics of nuclear-armed countries think about nuclear war. Nevertheless, important questions remain and, as is often the case in scholarly progress, answering some questions generates others we could not see clearly before. It would be both tedious and churlish for us to identify each point of agreement and disagreement we have with these four thoughtful commentaries. Instead, this essay has three parts. First, we comment on what we consider the most important points of contention raised by Bell, Pelopidas and Egeland, Joshi, and Braut-Hegghammer. Second, we discuss our views about why it is important for scholars to research and write about disturbing, and even dangerous, public beliefs about the use of force. We argue