LAUSR

period while limiting environmental harm” (13). Both UAE and Saudi Arabia score very high on the HDI (while there is no indicator of environmental harm). At the same time, the two countries score low on natural resource management and the concluding indexing on how effectively the states use the available “public brainpower potential.” In the country chapters, it is clear that there is a significant influence of “brainpower,” if not “public,” from external actors (NGOs, consultants, business). Additionally, in the conclusions, the author proscribes broader civil society engagement, while (rightfully) warning against populism. However, as much as technocrats and researchers can be a bulwark against populism, as suggested by Overland, their interventions must be based on a deeper understanding of the actors’ perspectives, power and interests in oil politics. The book is a valuable contribution to both academic and policy debates on good governance and natural resources. It not only brings out an important issue, but it is situated within the dominant resource curse theories which makes Overland’s book well placed to be an important and influential addition to the existing theoretical and policy debates. This is already suggested in that the open access chapters are available on the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative’s website. As the author points out, even with a halving of the petroleum industry, it is still massive, and there is continued need for more research on this issue. This book is a good start.