LAUSR

In Practical Shape, I give an account of practical reasoning whose main purpose is simply to convince people that there is, or at least can be, such a thing. Practical reasoning is reasoning whose conclusion is an action. Theoretical reasoning is reasoning whose conclusion is a belief. It has been standard for people to accept that no action can be the conclusion of reasoning, so that theoretical reasoning is the only reasoning there is. I try to show that an action can stand in just the same relation or relations to the reasoning that leads to it as a belief can stand in to the reasoning that leads to it. In previous work, I defended two views, the combination of which revealed to me the possibility of the position I defend about practical reasoning. In this sense, I got three for the price of two. The first of these views is really just a list of the various ways in which considerations can be practically relevant. A consideration (by which I mean here a matter of fact, an aspect of the situation that confronts me) can be a reason to act in a certain way – can count in favour of so acting; that I need to make this sentence as clear as possible is a reason for me to reflect carefully before I write. And a consideration, whether itself a reason or not, can also enable some other consideration to be a reason when it would not otherwise be, or disable a consideration from being the reason it would otherwise be. And a consideration, whether itself a reason or not, can intensify the reason given us by some other consideration, or attenuate that reason. These distinctions between different forms of relevance are now familiar, and they are important; and maybe there are more such to be recognized, so that the enquiry is ongoing. The second view is the claim I made in Practical Reality that propositions are not reasons for anything; among other things, they are not the reasons for which we act. The truth of a proposition can be a reason to do one thing rather than another, but that truth cannot be another proposition. Only states of affairs are reasons, and a state of affairs is something that is so, something that is the case rather than something that is true. The reasons for which we act are not always reasons so to act, because one can act in the light of a consideration which is (sadly) not the case, or in the light of considerations which are the case but are (sadly, again) not the reasons we take them to be. With these two views in hand, it seemed to me that practical reasoning could consist simply in adducing relevant considerations and responding in whatever way is most favoured by those considerations, taken together. The only difference between acting in