LAUSR

Abstract This article conducts a comparative public policy analysis of China’s generous urban worker basic pension system. It is commonly believed that Chinese local governments, which are motived by office-seeking incentives under decentralization, may foster economic growth at the expense of citizens’ social rights and thus “promotion tournament competition” comes into being. This article challenges this view by arguing that such competition can increase the generosity of social programs such as public pensions, especially in the condition of labor scarcity. This argument is supported by time-series cross-section analysis of 31 Chinese provincial units (1997–2013) using a novel indicator of the intensity of inter-locality competition. When the labor market tightens, workers can leave a locality to seek better compensation. Motivated by the promotion tournament competition to develop the local economy, which requires the issue of labor shortage to be addressed, local governments then provide generous local pension schemes to retain workers. Operating in a macroeconomic climate of labor scarcity, promotion tournament competition becomes an unlikely catalyst for welfare expansion in China.