ABSTRACT This article examines the impact of foreign shareholdings on agency costs of Chinese firms from 2006 to 2012. The empirical results indicate that: (1) direct foreign shareholdings, in contrast… Click to show full abstract
ABSTRACT This article examines the impact of foreign shareholdings on agency costs of Chinese firms from 2006 to 2012. The empirical results indicate that: (1) direct foreign shareholdings, in contrast to indirect foreign shareholdings, improve asset utilization, suggesting low agency costs; (2) qualified foreign institutional investors play a significant role in firms because they are less subject to political pressure, which is consistent with lower agency costs, but this effect could be eroded by government control; and (3) foreign shareholdings reduce the cost of equity and improve firm performance. The results contribute to the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the domestic/foreign ownership structure of firms.
               
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