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Sublicense and cartel enforcement mechanism in first price auction*

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ABSTRACT In 2017, the Italian Competition Authority opened a cartel investigation regarding the auction of international television sport rights. In particular, prior to several auctions, bidders have agreed to sublicense… Click to show full abstract

ABSTRACT In 2017, the Italian Competition Authority opened a cartel investigation regarding the auction of international television sport rights. In particular, prior to several auctions, bidders have agreed to sublicense the audio-visual football rights in a reciprocal way. Without any reference and evaluation on the specific case, this paper aims at showing that a sublicense agreements can modify the outcome of an auction, even in a first price sealed bid version. This is because the sublicense agreement can be used to indirectly implement a “bid submission mechanism” [RC Marshall and LM Marx, ‘Bidder Collusion’ [2007] 133(1) JET 374]. This result strongly supports the idea that such an agreement should be considered as restriction by object under European antitrust law.

Keywords: mechanism; sublicense; auction; cartel; first price

Journal Title: European Competition Journal
Year Published: 2019

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