LAUSR

ABSTRACT This article seeks to estimate the strength of Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent since it was launched in 2014 by looking at the presence, narratives and the campaigns that the group has tried to engage in. Drawing on primary sources such as the group's documents and interviews with analysts, it argues that AQIS’ strategy in the two nations is threefold; first, it has plugged itself into the various local narratives and challenges that the Muslim communities in these two nations face. Second, AQIS has presented itself as a more reliable and stable option than the Islamic State. Third, it has employed the use of strategic patience to stay under the radar and expand its base of operations in these two nations. In concluding the paper, it assesses that while the group has not launched many major attacks in these two nations, it has fulfilled its objectives of staying relevant in South Asia and presenting itself as a strong competitor to the Islamic State.