We may agree with Leiter, but the obvious claim that law is an artifact certainly does not reveal the whole story. The following several questions arise: (i) what does it… Click to show full abstract
We may agree with Leiter, but the obvious claim that law is an artifact certainly does not reveal the whole story. The following several questions arise: (i) what does it mean that law is an artifact? (ii) What is the metaphysical nature of artifacts? (iii) What is the role of intention and purpose in creating artifacts? (iv) What sort of artifact is law? (v) How does law differ from other artifacts of the same sort? (vi) How can the normativity of law as an artifact be explained? And (vii) are all laws artifactual? The volume is devoted to answering those and other related questions. Usually, volumes containing collected papers are not particularly homogenous as far as the topics are concerned. This volume is an exception from this general rule, as practically all chapters discuss either general or specific problems associated with the artifactual nature of law. This does not mean the authors always share similar views. On the contrary, major differences among authors regarding substance are visible, as some adopt different conceptions of artifacts that often make comparing their conclusions difficult. Editors have certainly been successful in that they have managed to attract so many reputable legal philosophers. The quality of all contributions is outstanding, which of course does not mean the readers will necessarily endorse all claims the authors defend. Most authors originate from common law countries, and the civil law background is represented by merely three authors (Corrado Roversi, Luka Burazin, and Giovanni Tuzet). Due to limited space, I am unable to refer to all problems discussed in the volume. As such, I will only touch on those I believe appear the most interesting and controversial. Of course, this is a purely subjective selection. I will ignore the sequence of chapters in the volume. In my opinion, the most important chapter is the one authored by Luka Burazin. In this chapter, the general theory of the legal system as an abstract institutional artefact is developed. The theory of Burazin is based on the social ontology of John Searle and Raimo Tuomela. Burazin (p. 113) argues that legal systems are (i) artifacts because they are created by human ‘authors’, (ii) institutional because they are norm-based and require collective intentionality, and (iii) abstract. The chapter is devoted to developing and explaining those claims. A legal system, as any artifact, has an intended character, and its intention (content of its author’s mental states) must be realised (p. 129); herein arises the first controversy. Brian Leiter argues in his chapter (p. 9–10) that the picture of law as ‘an object that has been intentionally made for a certain purpose’ is not applicable to legal systems. Particular laws are created intentionally for a certain purpose, but particular laws are tokens of a type of ‘law’. Leiter claims that it is not the case that the phenomenon of law captured by our
               
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