LAUSR

Interestingly, Ligthart and colleagues (2022) have considered extended reality (XR) technologies as a “moral prosthesis.” They argue that virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) technologies are promising tools in the field of forensic psychiatry, especially for the social rehabilitation of offenders. In this Open Peer Commentary, we focus on their moral argument favoring the use of XR to rehabilitate psychiatric offenders, as opposed to their legal analysis. Accordingly, we refine and extend the ethical argument for using XR to improve the moral capabilities of forensic offenders. This commentary offers the following four contributions. We first problematize some aspects of the term “moral prosthesis,” and favor the label “experience machine” as an alternative. We then defend the role of experiential learning through XR technologies in improving and preserving the morality of inmates. We next reinforce Ligthart et al.’s ethical proposal of using XR technologies to rehabilitate offenders by arguing that both psychiatric and non-psychiatric offenders have a moral right to be offered them. We conclude by emphasizing the prudential value and ethical desirability of enhanced moral autonomy for offenders. Firstly, Ligthart et al. propose the thought-provoking term “moral prosthesis” to refer to the use of XR technologies to support “the patient in overcoming their diminished moral capabilities and moral agency” (6). This label has obvious appeal. Undoubtedly, VR and AR technologies have the potential to “restor[e]” or “therapeutic[ally] enhance” psychiatric offenders’ moral functioning (6) by monitoring and modifying their mental states and behavior, just as prostheses restore the functioning of a missing body part. Ligthart et al. thus rightly recognize the potential of XR technologies as a “treatment tool” (6). However, the notion of “moral prosthesis” is not unproblematic. A first problem is that it restricts the application of these technologies to those who suffer from “diminished moral capabilities.” Several offenders plausibly do not suffer from deficiencies in their moral capabilities, but instead, engage in crime as a consequence of peer influence and/or poor formative educational experiences. We think that such (non-psychiatric) individuals could also benefit from XR interventions, insofar as they might prompt reflection and direct these individuals’ (already existing) empathetic and moral reasoning abilities toward hitherto overlooked targets (i.e. their victims). A second problem is that labeling these technologies as “moral prostheses” suggests they are necessarily conducive to better moral conduct. Yet, it is unlikely the use of XR in offending populations will always be for the best. For one thing, these interventions require further investigation to validate their effectiveness in improving moral behavior—and, in that process, the very content of the virtual experiences is something that may raise concerns from a research ethics perspective (Rueda 2022). But even if these technologies prove effective in enabling moral behavior for many, the very fact that they do not directly implant values means there will invariably be some who resist their persuasive influence. Labeling these interventions as moral prostheses thus obscures the contingent nature of their behavioral impact. A third and final problem is that the term “prosthesis” might be seen as pejorative. It might send out the message that those availing of XR technologies remain fundamentally unchanged; that the “prosthesis” is doing the moral work for them as opposed to training their moral capabilities. This, in turn, might be disrespectful.