LAUSR

ABSTRACT Naturalistic explanations for religious beliefs, in the form of the cognitive science of religion (CSR), have become increasingly popular in the contemporary sphere of philosophy and theology. Some claim to provide proof that theism, or religion more generally, is falsified, whilst others suggest that their theories are compatible with holding religious beliefs. In the following, I focus on the CSR of Justin L. Barrett, in order to argue that this particular naturalistic explanation can be seen to be compatible with both theism and atheism. Although Barrett is a proponent of his CSR’s compatibility with theism, and his work appears to imply that he is an incompatibilist when it comes to atheism and CSR, it is not immediately clear whether: (i) his CSR is definitely compatible with theism; and, (ii) why it should be seen as incompatible with atheism. I investigate these questions, utilising and extending research and tools from David Leech and Aku Visala, to argue for the conclusion that Barrett’s CSR is compatible with both theism and atheism, despite what his work implies. I consider the impact this has on the broader sphere of CSR, naturalistic explanations, and different religious worldviews.