LAUSR

i n the nicomachean ethics Aristotle provides a detailed account of the μεγαλόψυχος, the “great-souled man” who is virtuous to an exceptional degree and justly superior, rising above ordinary people and mundane concerns (4.3, 1123a34 –1125a35; cf. Eth. Eud. 3.5, 1232a18–1233a30). This man is distinguished by μεγαλοψυχία, or “greatness of soul,” which Aristotle declares to be the crowning virtue—a virtue in its own right that elevates all the others to a higher level and that is not to be found apart from them (4.3, 1123b28–1124a5). Aristotle argues, notoriously, that only an elite, high-status male can realize μεγαλοψυχία: possessing the other virtues is not sufficient, but one must also be fortunate enough to have noble birth, extensive wealth, and power, since such things are goods that make a person superior and worthy of greater honor (4.3, 1124a20–6)—μεγαλοψυχία concerns “great things” (4.3, 1123a34 –b8; 4.4, 1125b1–8) and involves “honor on a grand scale” (4.3, 1125a34 –5; cf. 4.2, 1122a18–25). from a moral point of view it is more admirable to be great-souled than not, despite the fact that only a select few people are in a position to develop the virtue of μεγαλοψυχία in the first place. 1