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I argue against Matthew Slater’s rejection of what he calls the grounding claim in his stable property cluster (SPC) account of natural kinds. This claim states that the epistemic value… Click to show full abstract
I argue against Matthew Slater’s rejection of what he calls the grounding claim in his stable property cluster (SPC) account of natural kinds. This claim states that the epistemic value of natural kinds depends on the existence of some ground to bind together a kind’s properties. Using two test cases from academic medicine, I show that grounds are genuinely explanatory of scientific epistemic practices and that the SPC account should not do without them in its philosophical analysis of natural kinds.
Keywords:
medicine;
natural kinds;
property;
clusters grounds;
stable property;
property clusters
Journal Title: Philosophy of Science
Year Published: 2017
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Journal Title: Philosophy of Science
Year Published: 2017
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!