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In a recent article published in this journal, Kris McDaniel (2019) proposes a variant of Peter van Inwagen’s (1983: 202–4) argument against the principle of sufficient reason that makes crucial… Click to show full abstract
In a recent article published in this journal, Kris McDaniel (2019) proposes a variant of Peter van Inwagen’s (1983: 202–4) argument against the principle of sufficient reason that makes crucial use of plural grounding. In this response paper I object to McDaniel’s argument. I argue that there is no notion of plural grounding available that is both irreflexive in the sense required for the argument to go through and general enough to formulate the principle of sufficient reason as proposed by McDaniel.
Keywords:
grounding principle;
plural grounding;
principle sufficient;
sufficient reason
Journal Title: Analysis
Year Published: 2019
Link to full text (if available)
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Journal Title: Analysis
Year Published: 2019
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!