LAUSR

Aging has been given short shrift as a topic in philosophy. The aim of this paper is to redress this neglect by revisiting some of the key philosophical issues in Simone de Beauvoir's book, Old Age. In her notion of old age's unrealizability, its impossibility of fully embodying a subject position, and the role played by the other in denying such subjectivity, she draws upon the work of both Heidegger and Sartre. The dilemma she repeatedly draws attention to, of always seeming to age in ways other than as one's self, raises the question of whether any view of aging as an authentic subjectivity may be no more than, in Heidegger's words, a 'chimerical undertaking'. In examining how the concepts of bad faith and inauthenticity are used by Heidegger and Sartre, the paper concludes that for both these writers, an authentic subject position can be maintained in later life, without ending up as the otherwise inauthentic subject of others' collective imaginary of 'a good age'.