LAUSR

This article argues that international human rights (quasi-)adjudicatory institutions should do better in considering the best interests of the child and freedom of religion in cases involving human rights aspects of alternative care and adoption. The European Court of Human Rights, particularly, has been using obscure and contradictory standards, which ultimately do not privilege the child’s best interests in matters affecting them directly. Recent Grand Chamber jurisprudence instead puts parents’ interests above the child’s. A child-centred approach where children are not objectified, but treated as autonomous, rights-bearing, legal persons, with independent interests that may override those of other stakeholders is needed. This article explores general international and European rules governing children’s religious rights in alternative care and adoption to expose the Court’s pitfalls in centring children in decision-making involving religion particularly. It generally promotes adoption of a child-centred approach in international human rights courts, and particularly highlights existing hurdles in such approach where the decision-making involves conflicting interests concerning religion.