LAUSR

International Affairs 00: 0 (2020) 000–000; doi: 10.1093/ia/iiz254 © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of International Affairs. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact [email protected] The liberal international order (LIO) is in crisis. The near-collapse of the global financial system in 2008; the emergence of ‘statist’ economies (especially the BRIC(S) states) as a counter-model; the rise of right-wing movements across Europe and the United States since the crisis; the Brexit vote and Trump’s election in 2016—these are just the most obvious signs.1 All these events challenge the various pillars of the LIO, from institutions of global governance to economic openness or multilateral trade and security cooperation.2 Few scholars and commentators would deny that the LIO currently faces the greatest and deepest challenge since its establishment after the Second World War.3 Two core questions accompany this diagnosis: Is there a possibility of ‘renewal and reorganization’ to save the LIO for the future? 4 And: What comes next? Authors who engage with the first question usually tend to accentuate the merits of the LIO and its role in building and maintaining a relatively stable, cooperative and prosperous order.5 Most of those who address the second question are concerned with the rise of China as a rival superpower to challenge US hegemony.6 The two questions have