LAUSR

In this paper, we argue that this proposed analysis of ‘will’ both lacks linguistic motivation and faces a variety of significant problems. We show that the standard arguments for Russell’s treatment of definite descriptions fail to apply to statements of the form ‘will(f)’. Hence, one can agree with Russell on definite descriptions, without that providing any motivation for the claim that statements of the form ‘will(f)’ should be given a quasi-Russellian analysis. For example, the structural ambiguities that are predicted by the Russellian analysis of descriptions are unattested when it comes to sentences of the form ‘will(f)’ embedded under e.g. negation and various attitude verbs. Consequently, we contend that the quasi-Russellian analysis makes the wrong predictions about the meaning of sentences of the form ‘will(f)’. Finally, we consider a possible fallback position: one could think that a weaker version of Todd’s position, without the Russellian baggage, might withstand our objections. But if Todd’s proposal is construed in this minimal way, i.e. as a claim merely about the truth-conditions of ‘will(f)’, given a certain sophistication to avoid the falsity of future necessities, the view collapses into another view that Todd has antecedently dismissed. This not only renders Todd’s analysis redundant, it leaves us with an analysis that according to Todd himself is inadequate.