LAUSR

We study the effects of strategy-dependent time delays on the equilibria of evolving populations. It is well known that time delays may cause oscillations in dynamical systems. Here we report a novel behavior. We show that microscopic models of evolutionary games with strategy-dependent time delays lead to a new type of replicator dynamics. It describes the time evolution of fractions of the population playing given strategies and the size of the population. Unlike in all previous models, the stationary states of such dynamics depend continuously on time delays. We show that in games with an interior stationary state (a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium in the standard replicator dynamics), at certain time delays it may disappear or there may appear another interior stationary state. In the Prisoner's Dilemma game, for time delays of cooperation smaller than time delays of defection, there appears an unstable interior equilibrium, and therefore for some initial conditions the population converges to the homogeneous state with just cooperators.