LAUSR

This paper aims to provide a twofold empirical comparison: first, a comparison between the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on agency costs proxies and firm performance measures, and second, this comparison was used before and after the 2008 financial crisis, capturing two different economic states.,Panel regression methods were applied to two data sets of non-financial firms incorporated in the FTSE ALL-Share index over the period 2005-2011.,The results provide evidence that not all mechanisms lead to lower agency conflicts and/or higher firm performance. Ownership identity has a significant impact and the role of the governance mechanisms changes with the changes in the economic conditions surrounding the firm.,The results lend support to the notion that forcing a certain code of practice on firms to follow could compel them to move away from conflict reduction governance structures.,To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper to provide a comparison of empirical evidence for the impact of board characteristics and ownership identity on agency costs and firm performance by using a comprehensive set of corporate governance mechanisms. This comparison challenges the prior studies that use performance as an indirect proxy for lower agency costs. Additionally, it compares the impact of the governance mechanisms during two different economic conditions.