LAUSR

Purpose This paper aims to identify and analyze the neoliberal, Anglo-American corporate governance mechanisms which embed shareholder value in Nigeria, and assess how they constitute major “practical barriers” to effective corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the country. While some of these mechanisms operate internally – performance-related pay (executive remuneration) – the use of non-executive directors – others operate externally – the markets for corporate control and the stock markets. Design/methodology/approach The paper adopts the doctrinal approach through a critical evaluation of concepts. Using existing literature in the subject area, it evaluates the nature of these mechanisms and argues that their operations amount to “practical barriers” to effective CSR in the country. Findings The paper finds that the existence of these mechanisms incentivizes corporate managers to maximize shareholder value and raise the share price of corporations as high as possible. It also leads to the financialization of corporate governance, rent seeking and the pursuit of short-term profits by corporations. In this context, within the Nigerian corporate governance framework, the existence and operations of these mechanisms amount to “practical barriers” to effective CSR. Originality/value The paper offers a fresh insight into the existence and operations of the neoliberal corporate governance mechanisms which embed shareholder value. By critically assessing the operations of these mechanisms in the Nigerian situation, it extends the body of knowledge in this area by showing how they amount to practical barriers to effective CSR in the country.