LAUSR

Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals are very vulnerable to spoofing due to the low power level and opening service mode. Although pseudorange-based Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) method performances effectively in spoofing detection and exclusion through a consistency check method, it might still suffer from threats which are deliberately designed. Besides an exhaustive research on the defense method, a deep understanding of the possible attack modes of the spoofing methods is also crucial for positioning security. This paper proposes a new threat for pseudorange-based RAIM, named adversarial attacks on GNSS positioning, which can mislead the victim receiver deducing any targeted position within a certain range without triggering the RAIM alarm. First, the adversarial attack is formulated as an optimization problem that minimizes the difference between the misled GNSS positioning results and the targeted position with RAIM missing detection. Then, the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) is applied to solve the optimization problem and obtain the adversarial examples for GNSS spoofing. Simulated and real GNSS data experiments are designed to verify the threat range and efficiency of the adversarial attacks on GNSS positioning.