LAUSR

The development of graphene enterprises can play an important role in promoting the graphene and other industries, further contributing to the operation of society. Cooperative ambidextrous innovation is an important strategy for graphene manufacturer and graphene application enterprises. To explore the coordination mechanism of cooperative ambidextrous innovation of graphene enterprises, this paper constructs the evolutionary game model between graphene manufacturer and downstream application enterprises. We analyze the stability of evolution strategies and influential factors in interfirm coordination of cooperative ambidextrous innovation. Furthermore, the paper builds a numerical model to simulate the probabilistic evolution trend and dynamic evolution process among different types of cooperative ambidextrous innovation of graphene enterprises. The results also show that for each type, increasing excess revenue and penalty costs have positive driving effects on the coordination behavior of cooperative ambidextrous innovation of the graphene manufacturer and application enterprises. Only by controlling the allocation coefficient of excess revenue and the risk-taking coefficient in the reasonable range can significant roles be achieved to the greatest favorable extent.