LAUSR

Named Data Network (NDN) is a network paradigm that attempts to answer today’s needs for distribution. One of the NDN key features is in-network caching to increase content distribution and network efficiency. However, this feature may increase the privacy concerns, as the adversary may identify the call history, and the callee/caller location through side-channel timing responses from the cache of trusted Voice over NDN (VoNDN) application routers. The side-channel timing attack can be mitigated by countermeasures, such as additional unpredictable delay, random caching, group signatures, and no-caching configurations. However, the content distribution may be affected by pre-configured countermeasures, which may be against the original purpose of NDN. In this work, the detection and defense (DaD) approach is proposed to mitigate the attack efficiently and effectively. With the DaD usage, an attack can be detected by a multi-level detection mechanism, in order to apply the countermeasures against the adversarial faces. Also, the detections can be used to determine the severity of the attack. In order to detect the behavior of an adversary, a brute-force timing attack was implemented and simulated of the VoNDN application on NDN-testbed. A trusted application that mimics the VoNDN and identifies the cached certificate on a worldwide NDN-testbed. In simulation primary results showed that the multi-level detection based on DaD mitigated the attack about 39.1% in best-route, and 36.5% in multicast communications. Additionally, the results showed that DaD preserves privacy without compromising the efficiency benefits of in-network caching in the VoNDN application.